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I. Introduction
Do you want to work from home and make money quickly?
Interested in being your own boss? Familiar to many, these
questions are exemplary of the “network marketing” techniques
often relied upon by direct sales companies, particularly multi-level
marketing companies (“MLMs”), to sell products and recruit new
participants. 1 MLMs, which employ a multi-level commission
structure, are commonly conflated with their illegal counterpart, the
pyramid scheme, since both models bear verticalized, multi-level
structures. 2 Direct selling, including the MLM business model,
holds a longstanding global economic position which remains alive
and well today. 3
Despite China’s 2005 regulatory regime barring all companies

1 See Adam Epstein, Multi-Level Marketing and its Brethren: The Legal and
Regulatory Environment in the Down Economy, 12 ATLANTIC L. J. 91, 91 (2010).
2 See id. at 102, 104–06 (describing the “upline-downline structure” as the key
distinction between “a legitimately successful MLM” and an illegitimate, illegal pyramid
scheme, and providing an overview of the factors used by the Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”) when deciding which category a business falls under); see also Multi-Level
Marketing Businesses and Pyramid Schemes, FED. TRADE COMM’N, (Oct. 2019),
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0065-multi-level-marketing-businesses-andpyramid-schemes [https://perma.cc/K8Y9-422Y].
3 Yuexin Miao, The Dilemma of Direct Selling in China, 37 ADVANCES IN ECON.,
BUS., & MGMT. RSCH. 393, 393 (2017) (“As an industry, globally, direct selling has a
history nearly 100 years [old], but in fact the concept of direct selling is not clear.”). See
also infra Section III-A-1 (recounting the historical context and progression of China’s
relationship with international direct sales). Direct selling is a $193 USD billion industry
worldwide that encompasses 118.4 million independent representatives. WORLD FED’N OF
DIRECT SELLING ASS’NS, FACT SHEET 1 (2019), https://wfdsa.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/04/Fact-Sheet-page-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3GUZ-4YXX]
[hereinafter FACT SHEET].
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with multi-level business models from market entry, certain societal
and economic factors put Mainland China 4 among the most
desirable markets for international direct selling companies. 5
Various enforcement actions and investigations demonstrate the
level of risk these companies assume to gain Chinese market access
without abandoning the customary multi-level business model or
acquiescing to other compliance burdens. 6
As a matter of positive law, MLMs are commonly confused with
their illegal counterparts, pyramid schemes. 7 Nevertheless, MLMs
maintain a secure position in the global economy, primarily due to
“legitimate direct selling business opportunities for non-salaried,
independent business owners in the United States and around the
world.” 8 In reality, direct selling and MLMs are notorious for
corruption and deceit, resulting in financial losses for their
“employees.” 9 In China, there is longstanding suspicion towards
direct selling. 10 In 2017, this suspicion increased again when
4 While finalizing this Note, the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s
Congress passed a national security law for Hong Kong (theretofore a Special
Administrative Region of China). China: National Security Law Must Not Become a
INT’L
(June
30,
2020),
Weapon
of
Fear,
AMNESTY
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/06/china-national-security-law-weapon-offear/ [https://perma.cc/E3JR-3KK7]. Because the economic effects of this law remain
unseen, “China,” as used in this Note, refers only to Mainland China: the geographic area
under rule of the People’s Republic of China, excluding Hong Kong. See id; see also
Emily Feng, 5 Takeaways from China’s Hong Kong National Security Law, NPR (July 1,
2020),
https://www.npr.org/2020/07/01/885900989/5-takeaways-from-chinas-hongkong-national-security-law [https://perma.cc/AWZ2-6BRT].
5 Ryan Mcmorrow & Steven Lee Myers, Amway Made China a Billion-Dollar
Market. Now it Faces a Crackdown., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/08/business/amway-china.html
[https://perma.cc/8SFC-MDAA].
6 See id.
7 See Epstein, supra, note 1, at 92.
8 See id. at 91 (internal footnote omitted).
9 See, e.g., id. at 92, 97–98 (“MLMs, including their founding members, have drawn
scrutiny for decades from federal and state regulators who have . . . questioned their
legitimacy altogether more akin to a pyramid scheme.”) (internal footnote omitted); see
also Miao, supra note 3, at 394 (“[E]thical problems [in China] aroused by multilevel
marketing . . . give a bad name to the direct selling as a whole in its market.”). See
generally JON M. TAYLOR, MULTI-LEVEL MARKETING UNMASKED: WHY MULTILEVEL
MARKETING IS UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ch. 1–2 (Consumer Awareness Inst. ed., 2017)
(ebook) (providing a more skeptical perspective of direct selling).
10 See, e.g., Mcmorrow & Myers, supra note 5; Yu Tian, On the Legal and Market
Analysis of “Direct Selling” in China, 3 INT’L J. BUS. & MGMT. 86, 89–90 (2008).
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Chinese media linked deaths of college graduates hoping to earn
money after graduation to joining domestic pyramid schemes. 11
Due to a deeply engrained national relationship culture, known
as guanxi in Mandarin, 12 and unique economic conditions resulting
in less consumer experience with privately-owned enterprises, 13
Chinese consumers prove more susceptible to being taken
advantage of through schemes associated with direct selling. 14 In
2005, China acceded to the World Trade Organization (“WTO”)
and passed the Regulations on Direct Selling Administration 15 and
Regulation on Prohibition of Pyramid Selling 16 (collectively,
“Regulations” or “2005 Regulations”) in an effort to combat
corruption and the detrimental societal effects of direct selling
enterprises. These Regulations effectively limit market entry for
foreign direct sales companies to single-level commission structures
and impose stringent procedural requirements on direct marketing
companies. 17
11 He Huifeng, The Perils of Pyramid Schemes: A Dark Corner of China’s Economic
CHINA
MORNING
POST
(Sept.
29,
2017),
Miracle,
S.
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2108031/perils-pyramidschemes-dark-corner-chinas-economic [https://perma.cc/L6HX-BJ3P]; see also Han
Rubo, Inverting the Pyramid, WORLD OF CHINESE (Sept. 21, 2019),
https://www.theworldofchinese.com/2019/09/inverting-the-pyramid/
[https://perma.cc/GM8L-FFJ3].
12 See infra Section IV-B (describing the interrelationship of guanxi and network
marketing techniques).
13 Previously a planned economy, China is a more recently developed into a market
economy with extraordinary growth. See, e.g., State Council Info. Off., China, China’s
Efforts and Achievements in Promoting the Rule of Law, 7 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 513, 526–
29 (2008) (providing an overview of China’s efforts to strengthen economic legislation
since its decision to adopt “opening-up policies in 1978” and “transition from a planned
economy to a market economy”). The official English translation from the Chinese State
Council
Information
Office
is
available
at
http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7041733.htm
[https://perma.cc/PW2V-8UY9]; see also Miao, supra note 3, at 396; Tian, supra note 10,
at 90.
14 See Tian, supra note 10 at 89–90; Mcmorrow & Myers, supra note 5.
15 See Zhixiao Guanli Tiaoli (直销管理条例) [Regulations on Direct Selling
Administration] (promulgated by the St. Council of the People’s Republic of China, Aug.
10, 2005, effective Dec. 1, 2005) ST. COUNCIL GAZ., Sept. 3, 2005 (China).
16 Jinzhi Chuanxiao Tiaoli (禁止传销条例) [Regulation on Prohibition of Pyramid
Selling] (promulgated by the St. Council of the People’s Republic of China, Aug. 10, 2005,
effective Nov. 1, 2005) ST. COUNCIL GAZ., Sept. 3, 2005 (China).
17 See China – Commercial Guide: Direct Marketing, INT’L TRADE ADMIN.,
https://www.trade.gov/knowledge-product/china-direct-marketing
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This Note explores the international implications of the 2005
Regulations by assessing events both preceding and following their
promulgation, including enforcement actions against direct sales
enterprises seeking to obtain or maintain Chinese market entry.
Specifically, this Note explores the asymmetric interrelations
between the legal allegations contained in such enforcement actions
and China’s unique socioeconomic conditions. For instance, this
Note addresses a significant misalignment between widespread
global anti-corruption efforts—often prohibiting bribery and giftgiving—and the practical necessity for foreign companies to
participate in Chinese gift-giving practices to succeed in Chinese
business culture.
Part I provides a broad overview of this Note’s primary foci.
Part II summarizes the legal frameworks and nomenclature of
global direct selling, addressing the asymmetrical definitions of
“direct selling” in the United States and China. Part III outlines
direct selling’s historical relationship with China: namely, China’s
transition from a planned to a market economy and its 2001
accession to the WTO. Part IV explores direct selling’s heightened
impact on Chinese consumers due to the nation’s unique economic
and cultural conditions such as guanxi and a jarring national wealth
gap. Part V analyzes enforcement actions pertaining to noncompliance with the Regulations and explores pertinent patterns
therein. Part VI briefly surveys the global direct selling industry’s
modern economic status in China. Part VII concludes, considering
the potential impact of international uniform direct selling standards
and recommending best practices for foreign direct selling
enterprises doing business in China to resolve latent tensions
between the Regulations and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(“FCPA”).
II. International Direct Selling and the Implications of
Industry Norms
The direct sales industry encompasses MLMs, which employ
multi-leveled commission structures, specifically upline-downline
structures, in which downline member performance determines the
uplines’ compensation. 18 The MLM structure holds a fairly secure

[https://perma.cc/6LHQ-LREU] (last updated Oct. 13, 2019).
18 Epstein, supra note 1, at 102–04.
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position in international direct selling. 19 However, MLMs are best
known, perhaps notoriously, for word-of-mouth recruitment and/or
sales techniques called “network marketing.” 20 Overall, MLMs and
their direct selling practices garner suspicion, often from consumer
protection advocates, as to their legality, validity, and financial
viability. 21
For instance, many network marketing 22 tactics used in direct
sales “can be extremely intense and sometimes misleading.” 23
“Concerns over fanatic, cult-like pressures preying upon potential
recruits in order to persuade them to join or remain within the MLM
membership ranks are quite common.” 24 These concerns may
increase due to hyperbolic economic claims made during
recruitment or sales, such as boasting extreme, unrealistic (though
undeniably desirable) income claims in recruitment efforts (i.e.,
growing the upline-downline). 25
Additionally, high-profile
incidents of corruption contribute to the widespread, negative
perception of the MLM business structure. 26

19 See id. at 91, 103–07 (explaining the differences between pyramid schemes, Ponzi
schemes, and MLM structures of direct selling); Miao, supra note 3, at 394.
20 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 1, at 96–98. For instance, network marketing
techniques often employ questions like: Do you want to work from home and make money
fast? Do you want to quit your job and be your own boss? See id.; see also supra Section
I (defining “network marketing”).
21 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 1, at 97 (explaining that state and federal regulators
are also critical of MLMs); TAYLOR, supra note 9, at ch. 5; Multi-Level Marketing
Businesses and Pyramid Schemes, supra note 2.
22 “Network marketing” is a form of mouth-to-mouth or grassroots marketing
commonly used in direct selling. See, e.g., Multi-Level Marketing Businesses and Pyramid
Schemes, supra note 2; Epstein, supra note 1, at 96–97.
23 Epstein, supra note 1, at 97 (describing MLM recruitment techniques); see also
Multi-Level Marketing Businesses and Pyramid Schemes, supra note 2. MLMs have been
known to make “outrageous claims[,]” and some have even employed “religious
component[s] . . . .” Epstein, supra note 1, at 98.
24 Epstein, supra note 1, at 97 (internal footnote omitted).
25 See id.; TAYLOR, supra note 9, at ch. 1–2, 2–12, 2–13 (“Prospects are typically
lured into MLM[s] with exaggerated product and income claims.”); Business Guidance
Concerning Multi-Level Marketing, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jan. 2018),
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/business-guidance-concerningmulti-level-marketing [https://perma.cc/SEC5-83CG].
26 See Business Guidance Concerning Multi-Level Marketing, supra note 25;
Epstein, supra note 1, at 92–93, 104–06; TAYLOR, supra note 9, at ch. 2–12, 2–13.
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A. Positive Law Doctrine: Internationally Inconsistent
Nomenclature in Direct Selling
Besides the common conflation of MLMs and pyramid
schemes, 27 nomenclature in the international direct selling industry
remains further disjointed, especially between the United States and
China. 28
Minimal legal research 29 on MLMs, especially
transnationally, also contributes to the industry’s lacking legal
uniformity.
1. Direct Selling in the United States: MLMs versus
Pyramid Schemes
In the United States, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)
defines direct selling as “a blanket term that encompasses a variety
of business forms premised on person-to-person selling in locations
other than a retail establishment, such as social media platforms or
the home of the salesperson or prospective customer.” 30 Thus, U.S.
direct selling, or direct sales, encompasses two distinct multi-level
selling structures: (1) a legally legitimate, sales-based MLM 31 and
(2) an illegal, illegitimate, recruitment-based pyramid scheme that

27 See Business Guidance Concerning Multi-Level Marketing, supra note 25; MultiLevel Marketing Businesses and Pyramid Schemes, supra note 2; Epstein, supra, note 1,
at 92.
28 See Tian, supra note 10, at 88–90; Miao, supra note 3, at 395–96; see also TAYLOR,
supra note 9, at ch. 2, pp.6–10 (advocating for “[a] more accurate, research-based
definition of MLM that addresses structural flaws”).
29 Epstein, supra note 1, at 92.
30 Business Guidance Concerning Multi-Level Marketing, supra note 25. In the
United States, most “direct selling” definitions include MLMs as a sub-category of direct
selling, but the individual definition of MLM varies. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 1, at
95–104; TAYLOR, supra note 9, at ch. 2–12, 2–13 (offering his own, more skeptical,
definition of MLM).
31 See Business Guidance Concerning Multi-Level Marketing, supra note 25. The
FTC defines MLM as a sub-category of direct selling:
Multi-level marketing is one form of direct selling. Generally, a multi-level
marketer (MLM) distributes products or services through a network of
salespeople who . . . .may earn income depending on their own revenues and
expenses. Typically, the company does not directly recruit its salesforce, but relies
upon its existing salespeople to recruit additional salespeople, which creates
multiple levels of “distributors” or “participants” organized in “downlines.” A
participant’s “downline” is the network of his or her recruits, and recruits of those
recruits, and so on.
Id.

84

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLVI

is financially reliant on recruitment or establishing an uplinedownline structure. 32 In other words, the legality of MLMs in the
United States depends upon the compensation scheme: 33 An MLM
must “pay compensation that is based on actual sales to real
customers, rather than . . . mere wholesale purchases or other
payments by its participants.” 34 A company’s compensation
scheme, not the mere presence of an upline-downline structure,
bears most upon legitimacy under U.S. law. If compensation
derives primarily from actual sales to third-party customers, the
MLM is likely legitimate. 35
However, while illegal pyramid schemes in the United States
“can look remarkably like legitimate MLM business
opportunities,” 36 pyramid schemes pose the risk of significant
financial loss. The following warning signs are characteristic of
pyramid schemes as defined by U.S. law: promoters making
“extravagant promises about your earning potential”; emphasizing
“recruiting new distributors for your sales network as the real way
to make money”; and playing on your emotions or using highpressure sales tactics. 37 Nonetheless, these warning signs may also
be found in legal MLMs in the United States. 38 Thus, even within
the United States, distinguishing legitimate MLMs from illegal
pyramid schemes proves to be a challenging and complex task. 39
This complexity only increases on an international scale.
2. Direct Selling in China Under the 2005 Regulations
China’s 2005 Regulations comprise the primary legal
32 See, e.g., id.; Epstein, supra note 1, at 100; Multi-Level Marketing Businesses and
Pyramid Schemes, supra note 2.
33 See, e.g., Multi-Level Marketing Businesses and Pyramid Schemes, supra note 2.
34 Business Guidance Concerning Multi-Level Marketing, supra note 25 (emphasis
added); see also Epstein, supra note 1, at 91, 103–04.
35 Business Guidance Concerning Multi-Level Marketing, supra note 25; Epstein,
supra note 1, at 103; Multi-Level Marketing Businesses and Pyramid Schemes, supra note
2.
36 Multi-Level Marketing Businesses and Pyramid Schemes, supra note 2.
(“Eventually, most [pyramid scheme] distributors find that no matter how hard they work,
they can’t sell enough inventory or recruit enough people to make money . . . . In the end,
most people run out of money, have to quit, and lose everything they invested.”).
37 Id.
38 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 1, at 95–100.
39 Id. at 123–24; see also TAYLOR, supra note 9, at ch. 11–38, 11–39.
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instrument governing Chinese market entry for foreign direct selling
enterprises and contradict U.S. direct selling law in several ways. 40
Most notably, the Regulations make no distinction between MLMs
and pyramid schemes, and thus legalize only single-level direct
selling subject to procedural market entry requirements, prohibiting
all multi-level marketing structures. 41
Defining direct selling as “a type of business mode, in which
direct selling companies recruit door-to-door salesmen to sell
products directly to ultimate consumers . . . outside the companies’
fixed places of business[,]” 42 the Regulations contradict U.S. law
insofar as they exclude any businesses with multi-leveled structures
from the market, regardless of their legality elsewhere. 43 Using U.S.
legal terms, both legal MLMs and illegal pyramid schemes are
illegal under China’s Regulations, which only permit direct selling
by single-level companies. 44 Under China’s Regulations, any multilevel, pyramid-like business structure, including the United States’
legal MLM, 45 is illegal “pyramid selling,” 46 regardless of legitimacy
elsewhere. 47 Thus, practically, the Regulations mandate significant
structural change for legitimate U.S.-based MLMs.

40 See Zhixiao Guanli Tiaoli, supra note 15, art. 3; Jinzhi Chuanxiao Tiaoli, supra
note 16, art. 2.
41 See Tian, supra note 10, at 86–87; Zhixiao Guanli Tiaoli, supra note 15; Jinzhi
Chuanxiao Tiaoli, supra note 16.
42 Zhixiao Guanli Tiaoli, supra note 15, art. 3; see also id. art. 13; Jinzhi Chuanxiao
Tiaoli, supra note 16, art. 2.
43 See id.; Tian, supra note 10, at 86–87; Miao, supra note 3, at 394–96; supra
Section I.
44 Zhixiao Guanli Tiaoli, supra note 15 arts. 3 & 13; Jinzhi Chuanxiao Tiaoli, supra
note 16, art. 2.
45 Miao, supra note 3, at 395; supra Section I.
46 See Zhixiao Guanli Tiaoli, supra note 15, art. 3; Jinzhi Chuanxiao Tiaoli, supra
note 16, art. 2. The 2005 Regulations define prohibited “pyramid selling” by reference to
various notorious characteristics of MLMs and direct selling enterprises:
The term “pyramid selling”…refers to such an act whereby an
organizer or operator…disturbs the economic order and affects the
social stability by recruiting persons, calculating and paying
renumerations to recruiters on the basis of the number of persons a
recruiter has directly or indirectly recruited or the sales performance,
or asking the recruiters to pay a certain fee for obtaining the
qualification for participation.
Jinzhi Chuanxiao Tiaoli, supra note 16, art. 2.
47 See Jinzhi Chuanxiao Tiaoli, supra note 16, art. 2; Miao, supra note 3, at 395.
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To further their underlying policy goal of adequate consumer
protection, the Regulations require more than just structural change
for market entry. 48 For instance, they explicitly prohibit practices
commonly associated with MLMs such as (1) basing commission
upon recruitment instead of sales; (2) requiring a fee, direct or
indirect, for membership; and (3) any pyramid-like internal
structure, such as upline-downlines. 49
Lastly, the Regulations mandate procedural requirements for
foreign direct sellers to enter the market. Most notable is the
requirement to obtain a direct selling license, which proves both
tedious and demanding. 50 Even when companies meet application
requirements, Chinese governmental approval of foreign
applications remains limited and arbitrary. 51 In 2018, only one new
direct sales company received a license, exhibiting a governmental
effort to limit industry growth. 52 Overall, China’s direct selling
industry “remains closely watched and tightly regulated at both the
central and local levels.” 53
48 See, e.g., Zhixiao Guanli Tiaoli, supra note 15, art. 11. See FAQ on Direct Sales
in China, LEHMAN, LEE & XU, http://www.lehmanlaw.com/resource-centre/faqs/bankingfinance/faq-on-direct-sales-in-china.html [https://perma.cc/TY7D-BP7J] (last visited
Nov. 1, 2019). For instance, the Regulations require all direct sales companies to formally
contract with sellers and give notice of employment rights. Id.; see also Zhixiao Guanli
Tiaoli, supra note 15, art. 16.
49 See Jinzhi Chuanxiao Tiaoli, supra note 16, arts. 2 & 7; Zhixiao Guanli Tiaoli,
supra note 15, arts. 13 & 14.
50 See China – Commercial Guide: Direct Marketing, supra note 17; see also Zhixiao
Guanli Tiaoli, supra note 15, art. 7–12 (enumerating the requirements to apply for and
obtain a direct sales license in China). Licensed products must fall within enumerated
categories. Id.; see also FAQ on Direct Sales in China, supra note 48.
51 China – Commercial Guide: Direct Marketing, supra note 17.
52 TMO GROUP, INDUSTRY REPORT: HEALTH & FOOD SUPPLEMENTS: CHINA MARKET
– 2020, AT 20 (2020), available at https://www.tmogroup.asia/downloads/china-healthsupplements-industry-report/ [https://perma.cc/Y68P-5W8U]; see also Gao Feng,
Spokesperson, Ministry of Com. of China (MOFCOM), Regular Press Conference of the
Ministry
of
Commerce
(Feb.
14,
2019)
(transcript
available
at
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/press/201902/20190202835091.shtml
[https://perma.cc/8JEN-ALCV]) (answering a question as to likelihood of direct sales
license issuance for 2019); infra Sections IV & V-B.
53 China – Commercial Guide: Direct Marketing, supra note 17; see also Mark
Schaub & David Hong, China Crackdown – How Does it Impact International MLMs?,
CHINA L. INSIGHT (Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.chinalawinsight.com/2017/08/
articles/compliance/china-crackdown-how-does-it-impact-international-mlms/
[https://perma.cc/M9VZ-2SUY]; Mark Schaub, Atticus Zhao & David Hong, A Castle
Built on Sand: Challenges and Opportunities for Network Marketing in China, CHINA L.
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Non-compliance with the Regulations may result in civil and/or
criminal liability under Chinese law, bearing significant
consequences in either case. If Chinese governmental authorities
determine that direct selling conduct constitutes an illegal pyramid
scheme under the Regulations, such violation may constitute “a
criminal offense” under Chinese law. 54 Even if conduct does not
comprise criminalized pyramid selling, non-compliance with the
Regulations may subject direct selling companies to significant
administrative sanctions. 55 Therefore, to avoid any liability under
the Regulations and/or Chinese criminal law, direct selling
companies, international and domestic alike, must comply with the
single-level structural mandate and licensure requirements.

INSIGHT (June 21, 2017), https://www.chinalawinsight.com/2017/06/
articles/corporate-ma/a-castle-built-on-sand-challenges-and-opportunities-for-networkmarketing-in-china/ [https://perma.cc/6FRJ-M5G4] (discussing potential consequences
for non-compliance with the Regulations). See generally Peter J. Wang, Yizhe Zhang, &
Qiang Xue, Looking Ahead: The Integration of Chinese Anti-Monopoly Enforcement
SOURCE
(Aug.
2018),
Authorities,
ANTITRUST
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/20182019/atsource-august2018/aug18_wang_8_16f.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8P4N-26NK]
(recounting that, as of 2018, China’s antitrust reform gave enforcement power for the
Regulations to a new state agency: the State Administration for Market Regulation).
54 David Hong & Mark Schaub, China 2019: Still Open for Network Marketing
Businesses, MLM.COM (Jan. 14, 2019), https://mlm.com/china-2019-still-open-networkmarketing-businesses/ [https://perma.cc/7N5N-VJ6S]. “[I]nternational MLM companies
which operate in China must change their compensation model for that specific market[,]”,
for if “such companies continue operating the same compensation model of multiple levels
of commission within the borders of China as they do in their home market, they can be
hit with criminal liability under Chinese law.” Id.; see also Jinzhi Chuanxiao Tiaoli, supra
note 16, arts. 13, 24, 28-29.
55 For instance, potential repercussions for companies non-compliant with the
Regulations may include being “branded as illegal pyramid schemes [which] will face
official [criminal] investigation . . . often result[ing] in the arrest of person-in-charge of
affiliates within China and company executives who travel to China[,]” and/or “the noncompliant company will quickly find out how fragile its business in China is – the Chinese
authorities can quickly move to shut down the company’s website and all social media
channels – [and] given the importance of social media and the internet in most network
marketing companies this effectively shut[s] down a company’s operations overnight.”
See Schaub & Hong, supra note 53.
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III. Chinese Governmental Intent Underlying the 2005
Regulations: Consumer Protection, Governmental Market
Control, and China’s WTO Accession
In the modern socio-political context, 56 the global narrative
underlying the Regulations characterizes them as a condition for
China’s 2001 accession to the WTO. 57 On the whole, China’s
unique economic conditions and contentious history with direct
selling engender a distrust of the industry, both domestically and
internationally.
A. China’s Economic Reform, 1990s MLM Movement, and
Subsequent 1998 Blanket Ban on Direct Selling
The normative underpinnings of China’s 2005 Regulations go
as far back as 1978, when China began major economic reforms.
The reforms carried significant socioeconomic implications as
China transitioned from a planned economy, associated with its
socialist era, to a modern market economy. 58
Within China, economic reform brought rapid industrialization,
urbanization, 59 and an “influx of transnational culture, capital, and
people” which must be understood “from a cultural and economic
framework more complex than the simple adoption of Euro56 The extent of the political and economic implications of China’s WTO accession
extend beyond this Note’s scope. See, e.g., How Influential is China in the World Trade
Organization?,
CHINAPOWER,
https://chinapower.csis.org/china-world-tradeorganization-wto/ [https://perma.cc/69AV-GJKL], (last updated June 18, 2020).
57 See
China
and
the
WTO,
WTO,
https://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/2MBT-G27W] (last visited June 13, 2020) (noting that China’s
accession occurred on Dec. 11, 2001); Press Release, WTO, WTO Ministerial Conference
Approves
China’s
Accession
(Nov.
10,
2001),
available
at
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr252_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/PTP9RGBR].
58 See, e.g., State Council Info. Off., China, supra note 13, at 526–29; CHINA URBAN:
ETHNOGRAPHIES OF CONTEMPORARY CULTURE 2 (Nancy N. Chen, Constance D. Clark,
Suzanne Z. Gottschang & Lyn Jeffery eds., 2001) [hereinafter CHINA URBAN]; U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, 2018 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S WTO COMPLIANCE 19-20
(2019),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2018-USTR-Report-to-Congress-onChina%27s-WTO-Compliance.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ARU-A3D2] (discussing the
benefits China gained by joining the WTO).
59 The extent of socioeconomic implications stemming from China’s economic
reform and subsequent urbanization goes beyond this Note’s scope. For a broad overview
of its implications and for thirteen ethnographies examining “the urban” and urbanization
processes in 1990s China, see generally CHINA URBAN, supra note 58.

2020 REINTRODUCING INTERNATIONAL DIRECT SALES COMPANIES

89

American neo-liberal capitalism.” 60 The Chinese state and the
Chinese market “are sometimes mutually constitutive, . . . [i]n other
instances, these categories are more ambiguous, more explicitly
oppositional, and less state initiated.” 61 This framework may
account for China’s often contradictory values: socialist-era
underpinnings inextricably tied to modern market economy values
and reality. 62
On the whole, governmental motivation behind the 2005
Regulations may be understood best by looking first to China’s
underlying motivations. These include, first, China’s 1998 direct
selling ban, and second, its joining the WTO in 2001, conceding to
the Regulations in return for an ultimately modern global economic
reign.
1. China’s 1990s MLM Movement and Subsequent
Direct Selling Blanket Ban
Because of China’s economic reform and delayed opening of its
economy, direct selling arrived in China later than nations like
America, Taiwan, and Japan. 63 Yet direct selling’s profitability
proved immediately apparent. By 1997, fewer than twenty years
after the nation’s first encounter with direct selling, China had 2,300
direct selling firms, employing up to 20 million citizens, and
boasted a $2 billion USD sales volume. 64 Further, by 1997, most
CHINA URBAN, supra note 58, at 2.
Id. at 10, 10–12 (providing an overview of these often contradictory values and/or
motivations). “While much has been written about the disempowerment of the nationstate in the face of increasingly flexible and mobile capital, in China we see a process of
negotiation between the state and new kinds of economic actors.” Id. at 10. “The
equivocal and contradictory position of the state, where officials increasingly find
themselves representing the interests of capital, is ironic . . . given . . . the nature of
relations between labor and capital . . . [as a] founding moral narrative[] of the entire
socialist era.” Id. at 11.
62 See id. at 12.
63 See Miao, supra note 3, at 394–96, 398 (noting that foreign direct selling firms
entered China in the early 1980s–90s); see also State Council Info. Off., China, supra note
13, at 515, 517, 522, 526-29 (tracing the economic development that led to the modern
entrance of direct selling firms into China’s markets); Lyn Jeffery, Placing Practices:
Transnational Network Marketing in Mainland China, in CHINA URBAN: ETHNOGRAPHIES
OF CONTEMPORARY CULTURE 23, 23–24, 28 (Nancy N. Chen; Constance D. Clark; Suzanne
Z. Gottschang; Lyn Jeffery eds., 2001).
64 See Miao, supra note 3, at 394–95; Jeffery, supra note 63, at 23–24. “From 1990
to its official ban in 1998, the Chinese [MLM] movement offered millions of Chinese the
opportunity to . . . partially replace or subvert conventional social geographies . . . . By
60
61
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urban Chinese citizens had at least heard of MLMs (chuanxiao), 65
and “many had friends or family who had tried it if they had not
done so themselves.” 66 However, in 1998, China issued a blanket
ban on direct selling 67 in the name of consumer protection and social
stability. 68 Governmental interest underlying China’s 1998 blanket
ban appears ambiguous, oscillating between genuine concern for
consumer protection and desire for state control over a rapidlygrowing, unexplored industry in China’s newfound market
economy. 69
Chinese officials insisted the 1998 ban was intended to
primarily prevent abuse by domestic Chinese pyramid schemes
taking advantage of China’s recently-liberalized laws against
private business and harming consumers, denying any exclusionary
targeting of foreign enterprises. 70 Acknowledging China’s genuine
need to safeguard consumers from deceptive domestic pyramid
schemes, 71 legitimate U.S. direct selling firms doing business in
China (e.g., Amway, Avon, and Mary Kay) 72 nevertheless felt that
the ban was overreaching. 73 This contention may prove more
1997, the multilevel marketing [] industry, introduced to China by American, Taiwanese,
and Japanese companies, had sold an estimated U.S. $7 billion . . . through networks with
some 10 million participants.” Id.
65 Jeffery, supra note 63, at 23; see also Tian, supra note 10, at 88–90 (providing an
overview of the translation of this term and potential causes for confusion).
66 Jeffery, supra note 63, at 41 n.5.
67 Miao, supra note 3, at 394–95; Jeffery, supra note 63, at 24, 39–40.
68 Miao, supra note 3, at 395.
69 See John Pomfret, China Bans Direct Marketing to Attack Scams, WASH. POST
(Apr. 28, 1998), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1998/04/28/chinabans-direct-marketing-to-attack-scams/b1178e4a-02cb-49d2-81d8-93b0fffb6b0c/
[https://perma.cc/77K5-MAET].
70 See, e.g., id.; see also Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, Avon’s FCPA Investigation in
China and Beyond, 10 FCPA UPDATE 7, 7-8 (2011); Jeffery, supra note 63, at 28.
Domestic Chinese direct selling scams “mimic American direct marketing operations in
that participants buy products to sell to other consumers[. H]owever, in the scams, the
products are often worthless.” Pomfret, supra note 69.
71 See Pomfret, supra note 69.
72 The descriptor “legitimate” conveys here that the named enterprises were
considered legal MLMs under U.S. law and, in the 1990s, conducting business in China
legally. See Pomfret, supra note 69; Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, News from the BRICs:
China: Avon Suspends Four Executives in Anti-Bribery Investigation, 1 FCPA UPDATE 5,
5-6 (2010) (reporting that Avon was the first direct selling company to enter China, legally
conducting business until its executives faced bribery charges in 2010.).
73 See Pomfret, supra note 69.
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reasonable considering that direct selling within networks of
personal connections makes an industry less susceptible to
governmental penetration. 74 This is particularly relevant to 1990s
China, which was then transitioning from a state-controlled market
with Chinese citizens becoming individual market participants with
subjective consumer interests and market practices different from
the state’s. 75
China’s purported rationale for the 1998 ban, primarily
corruption by domestic pyramid schemes, is difficult to reconcile
with the reality that the ban practically and normatively manifested
a desire to maintain state market control by limiting foreign market
influence and exposure in direct selling. 76 The multi-faceted
governmental intent underlying China’s 1998 blanket ban translates
almost directly to the 2005 Regulations. Both purport to protect
consumers from immediate potential harm from direct selling, both
domestic and international, while still maintaining a degree of state
control over consumer lifestyles and market practices.
B. The 2005 Regulations: A Condition for China’s WTO
Accession
The 2005 Regulations constitute one of multiple concessions
made for China’s 2001 WTO accession, 77 which endowed China
with “access to new trading partners[,] . . . better rates with current
ones, rais[ed] prospects for improved living standards domestically
and . . . a seat at the table in a globalizing” international economy. 78
Despite China lifting the 1998 blanket ban and re-opening its
74 See Jeffery, supra note 63, at 39–40; see also Michele A. Wong, China’s Direct
Marketing Ban: A Case Study of China’s Response to Capital-Based Social Networks, 11
WASH. INT’L L.J. 257, 257 (2002) (discussing China’s 1998 blanket ban on direct selling
and the potential of direct selling organizations as “self-motivated political force[s]”).
75 See Jeffery, supra note 63, at 39–40; see also Wong, supra note 74, at 272.
76 See Jeffery, supra note 63, at 39-40; see also Wong, supra note 74, at 260, 276–
77.
77 See generally, China’s Long March to WTO Entry, CNN.COM (Dec. 10, 2001),
https://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/east/09/18/china.wto.timeline/
[https://perma.cc/LC4X-8YUL] (providing a streamlined overview of China’s lengthy,
controversial WTO accession).
78 What
Happened When China Joined the WTO?, WORLD101,
https://world101.cfr.org/global-era-issues/trade/what-happened-when-china-joined-wto
[https://perma.cc/UNU8-GMPT] (last visited June 14, 2020); see also Miao, supra, note
3, at 395; Tian, supra note 10, at 86; State Council Info. Off., China, supra note 13, at 529,
543.
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economy in part to certain foreign enterprises, the Regulations
remain an issue today for U.S.-China trade relations 79 and
international direct selling. 80
IV. Direct Selling’s Unique Socioeconomic and Cultural
Impact on China
Economic and cultural factors make Chinese consumers
particularly susceptible to direct sales techniques. This Section
addresses two such factors. First, it analyzes China’s extreme
income gap and how this gap may leave already marginalized subgroups most vulnerable to get-rich-quick techniques. Second, it
addresses China’s deeply-engrained guanxi culture, assessing
heightened consumer reactivity to network marketing techniques
employed in direct sales.
A. China’s Ever-Present Wealth Gap and Direct Selling’s
Marginalized Appeal
In addition to the aforementioned factors lending to China’s
distrust of direct selling, 81 China today suffers from a jarring wealth
gap. Chinese citizens on the lower end of the wealth gap and many
79 Modern U.S.-China trade relations and disputes extend beyond this Note’s scope.
For more information, see generally U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 58; Philip
Levy, Was Letting China into the WTO a Mistake?, FOREIGN AFF. (Apr. 2, 2018),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-04-02/was-letting-china-wto-mistake
[https://perma.cc/C27Z-37HC]; U.S. CHAMBER OF COM. & AM. CHAMBER OF COM. IN
CHINA, PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S.-CHINA TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (2019),
https://www.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/tradereport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JX2A-LJJG]; Amanda Lee, China Refuses to Give Up ‘Developing
Country’ Status at WTO Despite US Demands, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Apr. 6, 2019),
https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3004873/china-refuses-givedeveloping-country-status-wto-despite-us [https://perma.cc/7JLX-JUKX]; Antara Ghosal
Singh, What Does China Want from WTO Reforms?, DIPLOMAT (May 21, 2019),
https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/what-does-china-want-from-wto-reforms/
[https://perma.cc/4FZX-QUET]; Silvia Amaro, ‘A Reform-or-Die Moment’: Why World
Powers
Want
to
Change
the
WTO,
CNBC
(Feb.
7,
2020),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/07/world-powers-us-eu-china-are-grappling-to-updatethe-wto.html [https://perma.cc/SUC6-5FC7].
80 See, e.g., U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, Appendix to 2019 REPORT TO CONGRESS
CHINA’S
WTO
COMPLIANCE
A-1,
A-95
(2020),
ON
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2019_Report_on_China’s_WTO_Compliance.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4KKF-HH8R]; U.S. CHAMBER OF COM. & AM. CHAMBER OF COM. IN
CHINA, supra note 79.
81 See supra Section III (addressing these economic factors, both historically and
contextually).
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others in financially precarious situations are more often victims of
the predatory practices often associated with direct selling. 82
As of 2018, China’s income gap was larger than the United
States’. 83 This gap must be assessed contextually, accounting for
China’s rapid and globally phenomenal $11 trillion economic
growth which, as of 2018, was still growing “by close to 7 per cent
a year, [with] newly minted billionaires regularly mak[ing]
headlines[.]” 84 Thus, Chinese citizens from lower income levels,
heretofore excluded from China’s highly publicized economic
growth and success, prove particularly susceptible to predatory getrich-quick techniques. 85 Reasons for this include these individuals’
financial status and China’s unique socioeconomic conditions,
which make such techniques appear feasible and leave
disadvantaged groups like agricultural workers and college
graduates more vulnerable to direct sales practices. 86
Rural and agricultural workers, 87 who almost always fall on the
low end of China’s wealth gap, 88 are one generalized example of
Chinese citizens particularly vulnerable to predatory techniques in
direct selling. China’s economic disparities are particularly
apparent “between urban and rural areas” 89 and this “urban-rural
divide” 90 remains “a key driver behind [China’s] rising income
82 See, e.g., Huifeng, supra note 11; Stone Shi, The Great Divide Between China’s
Rich and Poor, ZHONGGUO INST. (Nov. 27, 2018), https://zhongguoinstitute.org/the-greatdivide-between-chinas-rich-and-poor/ [https://perma.cc/57FR-RQRF] (“[A]s far as
income distribution goes, China is more unequal than some of the world’s poorest
nations[.]”). Its wealth gap has been called “the great urban-rural divide.” Id.
83 Shi, supra note 82.
84 Huifeng, supra note 11.
85 See, e.g., id. (“[M]any of those left behind by the economic boom – fresh university
graduates struggling to find a proper job, workers laid off from state factories where they
toiled for decades, and migrant labourers – also yearn to get rich quick.”).
86 See id. In some of China’s most egregious instances of pyramid scheme
corruption, participants attempting to escape were victims of physical beatings to coerce
them to stay. Even those who managed to escape sometimes remain brainwashed or
mentally affected by trauma. See, e.g., Rubo, supra note 11; Huifeng, supra note 11.
87 See Huifeng, supra note 11; see also infra Section III and accompanying notes.
88 See Huifeng, supra note 11; Shi, supra note 82. As of 2017, accelerated economic
growth had transformed China “in just a generation from an egalitarian society into a
country with one of the world’s largest wealth gaps[,]” a gap still increasing today.
Huifeng, supra note 11.
89 Shi, supra note 82.
90 Id.
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inequality.” 91 As a result, agrarian workers frequently fall victim to
get-rich-quick fantasies. Likewise, recent college graduates, who
may be in financially dubious situations, are another demographic
easily captivated by get-rich-quick techniques. 92 On the whole, jobsearching college graduates from local higher education institutions
(versus “prestigious key universities”) experience significant
difficulty obtaining post-graduate employment, which heightens
susceptibility to predatory practices associated with the direct
selling industry. 93
In 2017, Chinese social unrest about the industry 94 culminated
in a “three-month national campaign to crackdown on illegal

Id.
See Rubo, supra note 11; Huifeng, supra note 11.
93 See Rubo, supra note 11; Huifeng, supra note 11; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OP. AND
DEV. (OECD), CHINA IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 554-56 (2005)
(ebook). As of 2005, “an average of 20% of [] university graduates and 50% of [] graduates
from non-degree colleges cannot find jobs” in China despite China’s overall shortage in
university graduates and continued need for a skilled workforce. OECD, supra note 95,
at 555 (noting that, between 2001 and 2004, “[t]he number of higher education graduates
[in China] seeking employment increased from 1.15 million . . . to 2.80 million . . . , more
than doubling in just three years”). “[I]t is not only the graduates living in the
economically depressed areas who have [employment] difficulties….About 10% of the
university graduates in Shanghai, one of the most prosperous coastal cities, are
unemployed in the first 12 months after graduation.” Id.; see also id. at 554-55 (noting “a
growing problem of the labour market structure and the imbalance of demand and supply
of qualified human resources” in China, as of 2005). Relatedly, the Chinese direct selling
industry has been described as “provid[ing] [] low-threshold and flexible opportunities of
starting a business and employment for a large number of people who are short of
professional skills with lower education degree.” Shen Danyang, News Spokesman,
Ministry of Com. of China (MOFCOM), Press Conference of the Ministry of Commerce
(Nov.
4,
2015)
(transcript
available
at
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/counselorsoffice/westernasiaandafricar
eport/201511/20151101165802.shtml [https://perma.cc/U45X-697S]) (answering the
eighth question posed regarding what role the 2005 Regulations played in “the
development of [China’s] direct selling industry”).
94 See, e.g., China to Step Up Crackdown on Pyramid Schemes, XINHUANET (Apr.
10,
2018),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-04/10/c_137100941.htm
[https://perma.cc/ZE5N-BK7F]. As recently as 2019, China has demonstrated hostility
towards foreign direct sales companies. See, e.g., Li Lei, 91 Direct-Sellers Ordered to
Review their Management and Marketing Practices, CHINA DAILY.COM (Jan. 30, 2019),
http://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201901/30/WS5c50f518a3106c65c34e7360.html
[https://perma.cc/2HG9-HEV9]; China Suspends Registration and Approvals of Direct
Selling, XINHUANET (Feb. 14, 2019), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/201902/14/c_137821994.htm [https://perma.cc/XAW6-7F3W].
91
92
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pyramid schemes in China[.]” 95 This crackdown can largely be
attributed to the deaths of recent college graduates in “suspicious
pyramid scheme related circumstances” 96 and public uprisings in
July 2017 against a corrupt Chinese Ponzi scheme. 97 The 2017
public protests focused on the “cult-like activities” 98 of unlawful
pyramid schemes, escalating existing outrage in the media about the
college graduates’ deaths. 99
China’s economic conditions, including its extreme income gap,
engender the high likelihood of sub-groups like agrarian workers
and college graduates falling for unlawful, predatory direct selling
practices. China’s uniquely contentious, personal relationship with
direct selling may offer some justification for the stringent
consumer protection policies latent in the 2005 Regulations.
B. Guanxi: The Unique Susceptibility of Chinese Consumers
to Network Marketing
China’s national relationship culture, guanxi, 100 makes Chinese
Schaub & Hong, supra note 53.
Id.; see also Huifeng, supra note 11; Rubo, supra note 11 (revealing the extreme
corruption of certain Chinese pyramid schemes). One of the first cases involving the death
of a college graduate was twenty-three-year-old Li Wenxing, whose body “was found in a
pond on the outskirts of Tianjin on July 14, two months after . . . arriv[ing] in the city” as
a recent college graduate. Huifeng, supra note 11.
97 See Schaub & Hong, supra note 53. For a general overview of the legal
distinctions between Ponzi schemes, MLMs, and pyramid schemes, see Epstein, supra
note 1, at 106–09.
98 See Schaub & Hong, supra note 53.
99 See id.
100 Guanxi literally means “personal connections, relationship or social networks” and
“implies trust and mutual obligations between parties, and [] operates on personal, familial,
social, business and political levels[:] Having good, bad or no guanxi impacts one’s
influence and ability to get things done.” Michael C. Wenderoth, How a Better
Understanding of Guanxi Can Improve Your Business in China, FORBES (May 16, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelcwenderoth/2018/05/16/how-a-betterunderstanding-of-guanxi-can-improve-your-business-in-china/#5c7b8cde5d85
[https://perma.cc/3KLM-5F98]. Guanxi requires mutual trust and “friendship or familial
feelings[,]” paying homage to “China’s implicit “traditional rule of virtue[.]” Mary Szto,
Chinese Gift-Giving, Anti-Corruption Law, and the Rule of Law and Virtue, 39 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 591, 593, 610 (2016) (“China’s traditional rule of virtue is a tenet of
Confucianism that a government’s promotion of virtue is superior to governance by legal
measures. Virtue is cultivated through ritual [e.g., gift-giving].”).
Guanxi “is widely acknowledged as essential for successful business dealings in
China.” Szto, supra, at 593; see also Wenderoth, supra (noting that a study performed on
700 Chinese entrepreneurs about the impact of social networks on business success
95
96
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consumers uniquely susceptible to network marketing, 101 bolstering
direct selling’s influence in China. Guanxi’s interrelation with the
direct selling industry likely furthers the governmental desire to
limit the industry’s presence (especially via foreign influence) to
ensure a high degree of state-market involvement and oversight. 102
Essential to direct selling’s success in China in the 1990s,
guanxi complements the essence of direct selling: the proliferation
of personal relationships to increase sales volume. 103 Despite being
“a key reason why network marketing is such big business in
China[,]” 104 some scholars nonetheless advocate against excessive
profiting in China via guanxi and network marketing, warning of

suggested “higher trust and being strategically connected (having guanxi, or broker
networks) was correlated to business success”). In Chinese business, “effective guanxi
requires ganqing and renqing, or friendship or familial feelings[,]” Szto, supra at 593, and
“foster[s] familial ties among business partners that lead to trust[,]” id. at 611. Renqing
“may be translated as human warmth, favor, or sympathy” and ganqing “may be translated
as affection” or “a present feeling based on past treatment; it creates guanxi, or an
obligation for the future.” Id. at 611, 620 (“Having guanxi means having reliable people
who can help when one is in need.”).
Gift-giving is argued as essential for cultivating guanxi, both traditionally and in
modern Chinese business. Id. at 593, 620-26; but see Wenderoth, supra (pointing out “the
downsides of guanxi” such as the common association “with corruption” and the potential
to “lead to dangerous reciprocal obligations and collective blindness”). Gift-giving
cultivates guanxi by “creat[ing] future obligations[.]” Szto, supra, at 620. A gift’s value
is “directly tied to ganqing: obligation, strength of feeling, and dependability.” Id.
Likewise, “the lapse of time between a gift and its return gift[] heighten[s] the moral stance
of the gift.” Id. (noting that “giving a return gift of equal value within a day or two was
considered an insult”). Simultaneously, “[g]iving a gift demonstrates one’s economic
power[.]” Id. (internal quotations and footnote omitted); see also Id. at 592, 620–21
(expanding upon the concept of mianzi).
To keep up with China’s recent economic growth, “guanxi must be expressed
through gifts of increased value.” Id. There remains a distinction between virtuous giftgiving and bribery in the guanxi system: “whether the payment is to develop a relationship
or to achieve an immediate gain.” Id. at 621 (emphasizing that “immediate gain” resulting
from gift-giving indicates bribery). In sum, “[g]uanxi is about increasing resources
through repeated reciprocal acts of favor and ganqing and renqing, or familial affection.”
Id. at 626.
101 See supra Section II (providing a brief summary of network marketing strategies
and normative implications).
102 See, e.g., supra Section III-A. See generally Jeffery, supra note 63 (proposing that
China’s 1998 blanket ban on direct selling was tied to, at least in part, a governmental
desire to maintain market and consumer control).
103 See Jeffery, supra note 63.
104 Hong & Schaub, supra note 53.
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potential “damage [to] the foundation of Chinese society[.]” 105 Both
guanxi and network marketing depend upon “interpersonal
relationships.” 106 However, traditional guanxi departs from U.S.
networking, especially in business relations. 107
As opposed to the contractual style of U.S. business, which
depends upon “strong codified laws[,]” 108 Chinese business success
depends upon effective guanxi, relying upon personal networking
or trust 109 and requiring mutual trust, or similar “friendship or
familial feelings.” 110 These contrary cultural dispositions heighten
susceptibility of Chinese consumers to transnational network
marketing because it “sells interpersonal relationships[,]” 111
emphasizing relational opportunities. 112
“Word-of-mouth
[network] marketing has a much higher conversion rate [in China]
than traditional forms of marketing because of the importance
which the Chinese place upon trusting their close friends and
family. This nurturing of relationships is what drives the prevalence
of network marketing businesses in China.” 113
Guanxi remains essential for successful business in China
today, 114 and, since China’s economic transition from planned to
105 Miao, supra note 3, at 397 (reasoning that “relationship management is a product
of social culture”).
106 Id.
107 See Wenderoth, supra note 100; Miao, supra note 3, at 397; State Council Info.
Off., China, supra note 13, at 514, 517.
108 See Wenderoth, supra note 100.
109 See id. (identifying “networks of trust and mutual obligations” as important to
Chinese business success); Miao, supra note 3, at 397 (explaining that China’s economy
remains highly “dependen[t] on social stability”); State Council Info. Off., China, supra
note 13, at 514, 517; see also Zhu Wenquian, Culture as a Pillar of the Nation’s Economy,
CHINADAILY ASIA (Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.chinadailyasia.com/business/201604/18/content_15417941.html [https://perma.cc/BWT3-G9NP].
110 Szto, supra note 100, at 593.
111 Miao, supra note 3, at 397.
112 See id.; Wenderoth, supra note 100.
113 Hong & Shaub, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. “Network[]
marketing is alive and thriving in China. This can be seen in the dynamic and innovative
nature of the business in China. Wildly successful domestic and international networking
marketing companies have tapped into China’s relationship culture, known in China as
‘guanxi’.” Yet “network marketing is not static in China – the market is still growing and
innovative programs are constantly popping up . . . . [Thus,] competitive companies need
to innovate, whether in business model, compensation or reward mechanisms.
Differentiation is key.” Id.
114 Szto, supra note 100, at 625–26.
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market economy, has expanded beyond the traditional, familial
setting into capitalized business practices 115 via gift-giving. 116 In
“urban [Chinese] business[,]” 117 “gift-giving among business
associates and government officials” 118 is practically required for
effective, successful business in China. 119 Further, China’s modern
economic conditions require amplification of traditional guanxi
gift-giving, which solidifies gifts in the Chinese business context as
emblems of “privilege and status.” 120 Since a gift’s value is directly
related to the extent of its returned obligation, effective guanxi and
business in the modern Chinese economy require giving and
receiving “gifts of increased value[,]” 121 thereby reinforcing gifts as
longstanding symbolizations of one’s status, 122 and also
emphasizing gift-giving as necessary for successful Chinese
business ventures. 123 Thus, guanxi gift-giving constitutes a practical
business requirement for success in China’s urban business
sector. 124 This practical economic necessity exacerbates the
economic plight of citizens at the lower end of the Chinese national
wealth gap, 125 as China’s economic success via exclusionary,
capitalistic guanxi gift-giving practices elude them. 126

115 See Szto, supra note 100, at 593, 620, 626; Wenderoth, supra note 100. It has
been suggested that one should assess one’s business guanxi in terms of three levels—
personal, business, and sector or governmental—expanding guanxi beyond initial,
personalized roots. Wenderoth, supra note 100.
116 Szto, supra note 100, at 611.
117 Id. at 620.
118 Id. at 626.
119 See id.
120 Id. at 611; see also Id. at 620-21. Emphasizing the importance of virtuous giftgiving when doing business in China, “wise and faithful giving” is suggested for adhering
to traditional guanxi, such as allowing time to pass before returning the gift in order to
“heighten[] the moral stance of the gift” and/or giving a “return gift” at least equivalent in
value to the original gift. Id. at 620–21 (internal footnote omitted).
121 This correlation has been pointed out as directly related to Chinese consumers’
status as “the largest number of luxury goods consumers in the world.” Id. at 620, 626 (“It
is also not an accident that today Chinese are the number one consumers of luxury goods
in the world; and that officials may receive up to half of these goods.”).
122 Szto, supra note 100, at 610.
123 See id. at 611, 620–21, 625.
124 See id. at 593, 620, 625.
125 See supra Section IV-A (discussing the pertinence and extremity of China’s wealth
gap).
126 See id.; Szto, supra note 100, at 611, 620–21, 625 (discussing the capitalistic
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Deeply-engrained in the national psyche, guanxi increases the
direct selling industry’s attraction to the already-desirable Chinese
market by heightening consumer reactivity to network marketing. 127
In addition to China’s unique economic conditions, 128 cultural
susceptibility to network marketing contributes further to the need
for consumer protection policies as exhibited in the Regulations. 129
V. Non-Compliance with the Regulations: U.S. Enforcement
Standards and Patterns under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (“FCPA”) for Chinese Subsidiary Conduct
Indirectly, China’s 2005 Regulations often manifest in the
United States regulatory system, either in actions brought under the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA” or “the Act”) 130 by the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”),
and/or by the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”). In these
actions, U.S.-based direct sales companies allegedly violate (1) the
Act’s anti-bribery provisions, 131 and/or (2) the Act’s accounting
provisions, 132 including (a) the “books and records provision” 133 and
(b) “internal controls provision[.]” 134 When intertwined with
development of guanxi gift-giving in the Chinese business context).
127 See Miao, supra note 3, at 396; see also Schaub et al., supra note 53.
128 See supra Sections III-A & IV-A.
129 See Miao, supra note 3, at 397; see also Jeffery, supra note 63, at 37–40.
130 See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et
seq. (“FCPA” or “the Act”).
131 See id. § 78dd-1 (prohibiting and sanctioning the bribery of foreign officials). The
anti-bribery provisions “can apply to conduct both inside and outside the United States.”
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIM. DIV. & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO
THE
U.S.
FOREIGN
CORRUPT
PRACTICES
ACT
10
(2012),
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-resource-guide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YVQ8LPLZ] [hereinafter RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE FCPA] (emphasis added).
132 See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2)(A), (b)(2)(B) (containing the accounting
provisions of the FCPA).
133 The “‘books and records provision” of 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) mandates that
international direct sales companies “make and keep books, records, and accounts, which,
in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the [company’s] transactions and
dispositions of [its] assets.” RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE FCPA, supra note 131, at 39 (internal
footnote omitted). See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (containing the statutory text
of the books and records provision).
134 RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE FCPA, supra note 131, at 38 (“[U]nder the ‘internal
controls’ provision” [15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B)], international direct sales companies
‘must devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to assure
management’s control, authority, and responsibility over the firm’s assets.’”). See
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China’s Regulations, a recurring pattern appears in these FCPA
actions. U.S.-based direct sellers, as parent companies of Chinese
subsidiaries, are held liable under the Act (or otherwise used as a
vehicle for liability) for the subsidiary’s extraterritorial conduct in
China, most often due to unlawful attempts to obtain, or maintain,
Chinese market access under the 2005 Regulations.
For instance, in 2014, Avon (notably the first foreign direct sales
company to obtain a license under the Regulations) 135 and its
Chinese subsidiary, Avon China, both plead guilty to criminal
violations of the FCPA anti-bribery provisions. 136 Avon China
“made $8 million worth of payments in cash, gifts, travel, and
entertainment to gain access to Chinese officials implementing and
overseeing direct selling regulations in China[.]” 137 The unlawful
payments were made in an attempt to maintain both its direct sales
license and the significant financial benefits accrued therefrom.138
According to an SEC statement, after obtaining the direct selling
license, “sales revenue in China then ‘grew 44%[.]’” 139 Further,
after receiving the license, Avon “achieved operating profits of $3

generally 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B) (containing the statutory text of the internal controls
provision).
135 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Avon With FCPA
Violations: Avon Entities to Pay $135 Million to Settle SEC and Criminal Cases (Dec. 17,
2014),
available
at
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2014-285.html
[https://perma.cc/T777-J8VK]. Avon “received the first direct selling business license in
China in March 2006.” Id.; see also Miao, supra note 3, at 394.
136 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Avon China Pleads Guilty to Violating the
FCPA by Concealing More Than $8 Million in Gifts to Chinese Officials (Dec. 17, 2014),
available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/avon-china-pleads-guilty-violating-fcpaconcealing-more-8-million-gifts-chinese-officials [https://perma.cc/8WE3-KY65].
137 Payments “include[d] paid travel for Chinese government officials[,] . . . gifts such
as Louis Vuitton merchandise, Gucci bags, Tiffany pens, and corporate box tickets[.]”
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 135 (emphasis added); Complaint
at 10–14, SEC v. Avon Products, Inc., No. 14-CV-9956 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2014).
138 “Avon’s subsidiary . . . paid millions of dollars to government officials to obtain a
direct selling license and gain an edge over their competitors, and the company reaped
substantial financial benefits as a result[.]” Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
supra note 135 (internal quotations omitted). The payments were made also to “avoid
fines or negative news articles” impacting “Avon’s clean corporate image required to
retain the license.” Id.
139 Robert Appleton & Kenton Atta-Krah, Does Voluntary Disclosure Make More
Sense
After
Goodyear?,
LAW360
(Mar.
4,
2015),
https://www.law360.com/articles/626656 [https://perma.cc/2XCG-X6UD].

2020 REINTRODUCING INTERNATIONAL DIRECT SALES COMPANIES

101

million” after incurring “a $1 million loss” the year before. 140 Both
entities incurred criminal penalties 141 for these violations.
Additionally, parent company Avon “agreed to implement rigorous
internal controls, cooperate fully with the department and retain a
compliance monitor for at least 18 months.” 142
Similarly, the adjacent action against Avon under the FCPA
accounting provisions 143 resulted in civil penalties of “more than
$67.36 million” 144 for each entity. In determining this penalty, the
SEC considered various factors such as Avon China’s failure to
fairly and accurately record the nature and purpose of the
payments 145 and the parent company’s inadequate remedial efforts,
such as missing correctional opportunities in its China subsidiary.146
In 2016, the SEC brought an action against Nu Skin Enterprises,
Inc. under the FCPA accounting provisions for extraterritorial acts
of its China subsidiary (“Nu Skin China”). 147 The unlawful payment
that ultimately provoked the SEC action arose out of a Chinese
provincial investigation against Nu Skin China for violation of the
2005 Regulations. 148 An internal Nu Skin China email evidenced
the subsidiary’s unlawful intent underlying the improper payment
by proposing an investigatory alternative where they were “not
charged and . . . ‘donate[d] some money instead of a fine.’” 149 To
execute this endeavor, the subsidiary obtained the influence of a
Id. (emphasis added).
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 136 (reporting a total of
“$67,648,000 in criminal penalties”).
142 Id.
143 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 135.
144 Id. (calculating this figure by totaling Avon’s agreed-upon disgorgement plus
prejudgment interest).
145 See id.
146 See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 135; Appleton & AttaKrah, supra note 139.
147 SEC Charges Nu Skin Enterprises, Inc. with FCPA Violations, SEC (Sept. 20,
2016),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-78884-s.pdf
[https://perma.cc/87NU-UYF3]; see also In the Matter of Nu Skin Enterprises, Inc., Admin
Proc. File No. 3-17556 (Sept. 20, 2016) at 2.
148 See In the Matter of Nu Skin, supra note 147, at 4. The Chinese Administration of
Industry and Commerce was investigating Nu Skin China for “unauthorized activities of
its sales representatives” in violation of the Regulations, which threatened the subsidiary
with a fine of $431,088 U.S.D. and potential trouble maintaining its direct selling license.
See id. at 2-4.
149 Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
140
141
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high-ranking Chinese official 150 via a $154,000 “donation” to his
charity. 151 This “charitable” donation resulted in a written donation
agreement 152 and ceremony where the official spoke, praising Nu
Skin China. 153 Two days after the ceremony, it was announced that
Nu Skin China “was neither charged nor fined” 154 for the regulatory
investigation. Provoking the SEC action, on an expenditure
authorization form, 155 Nu Skin China unlawfully labeled the
$154,000 payment as a charitable donation. 156 In reality, the
payment was made for the improper purpose of “influenc[ing a
Chinese] Party Official to favorably impact the outcome of” 157 a
provincial investigation against Nu Skin China for violating the
Regulations. 158
Like Avon, Nu Skin’s subsidiary committed the unlawful
conduct, yet the parent company bore FCPA liability to the extent
possible for:
[failing to] devise and maintain a reasonable system of internal
accounting controls over its subsidiary’s operations in China to
ensure that transactions were recorded as necessary to maintain
accountability for assets . . . [G]iven the well-known corruption
risks in China, 159 Nu Skin did not ensure that adequate due
diligence was conducted by Nu Skin China with respect to
charitable donations to identify links to government or political
party officials and to prevent payments intended to improperly
influence such persons in violation of the company’s anti-

Id. at 3–4.
Further indicative of improper motive was Nu Skin China’s agreement to obtain
“college recommendation letters for the Party Official’s child” from “an influential U.S.
person[.]” Id. at 2–4.
152 The final version of this agreement, between Nu Skin China and the charity
(unbeknownst to, and against the advice of U.S. counsel) omitted the suggested anticorruption language. See id. at 4.
153 Id.
154 In the Matter of Nu Skin, supra note 147, at 4.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 2, 4.
157 Id. at 4.
158 The Chinese Administration of Industry and Commerce was investigating Nu Skin
China for “unauthorized activities of its sales representatives” in violation of the
Regulations, which threatened the subsidiary with a fine of $431,088 U.S.D. and potential
trouble maintaining its direct selling license. See id. at 2-4.
159 See, e.g., Szto, supra note 100, at 596–603, 609–12, 620–27.
150
151

2020 REINTRODUCING INTERNATIONAL DIRECT SALES COMPANIES

103

corruption policy and the FCPA. 160

Most recently, in 2019, the SEC brought an action against
Herbalife under the Securities Act 161 and the Exchange Act 162 for
unlawfully issuing false and misleading statements. 163 In the
settlement agreement, 164 Herbalife agreed to pay a $20 million
punitive fine. 165 However, just six weeks after the SEC settlement,
the DOJ indicted two former executives of an Herbalife subsidiary,
Herbalife China 166 for violating the anti-bribery and accounting
provisions of the FCPA. 167 Herbalife remains unnamed in the DOJ
indictment, but circumstantial evidence and secondary sources
indicate Herbalife as the MLM at issue that formerly employed
defendants Yanliang Li and Hongwei Yang as high-level
executives. 168
Again, like Avon and Nu Skin, the charges alleged attempts to
maintain direct selling licenses under the Regulations. 169
Specifically, the DOJ alleged that defendants corruptly
influenced 170 Chinese governmental investigations and stateIn the Matter of Nu Skin, supra note 147, at 4.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a)(2)–(3).
162 See § 78m(a).
163 The SEC found certain statements in Herbalife’s quarterly and annual SEC filings
untrue because they claimed to use a different business model in China when, in fact, its
“compensation model in China” was “similar . . . to the one it employed in every other
country[.]” The SEC found the statements “false and misleading[.]” See Press Release,
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Herbalife to Pay $20 Million for Misleading Investors, (Sept. 27,
2019),
available
at
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-195
[https://perma.cc/FU3L-SUF4] (emphasis added).
164 Herbalife neither admitted to nor denied the findings. See In the Matter of
Herbalife Nutrition Ltd., Admin Proc. File No. 3-19536 (Sept. 27, 2019) at 1.
165 See, e.g., id. at 11; Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 163.
166 Herbalife operates in China “through a group of wholly owned subsidiaries based
in China” as Herbalife China. Bruce Zagaris, 2 Former Executives of Chinese Subsidiary
of Herbal Life Charged with Corruption, 35 INT’L ENF’T L. REP. 407, 407 (2019). The
two former Herbalife China executives were Yanliang Li and Hongwei Yang, “also known
as Mary Lang[.]” Id.; Sealed Indictment at 3–5, United States v. Li, 19 Crim. 760
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2019) [hereinafter Herbalife Indictment].
167 See Herbalife Indictment, supra note 166, at 6–18.
168 See, e.g., Zagaris, supra note 166, at 407–08; Herbalife Indictment, supra note
166, ¶¶ 1-7.
169 Again, financial incentive appears plausible. As of 2016, “Herbalife China was
responsible for approximately 20 percent of Herbalife’s worldwide net sales, which
surpassed $4 billion.” Zagaris, supra note 166, at 407.
170 Herbalife Indictment, supra note 166, at 7.
160
161
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controlled media via unlawful payments. 171 The alleged payments
include, inter alia, round-trip airline tickets, a shopping trip and spa
visit for a Chinese official, his daughter, and her classmates, an
internship for a senior government official, and Herbalife China
“receiving $772,433 in reimbursement [from its parent company]
for purportedly entertaining 4,312 gov’t officials at 239 meals . . .
and providing fruits and vegetables for officials.” 172
Additionally, defendants violated the FCPA accounting
provisions by circumventing the parent company’s internal controls
meant to prevent bribery and fraud. 173 Similar to Nu Skin,
Herbalife’s failure as a parent company to “identify, investigate,
stop the payments, [or] take remedial action” 174 indicated either “big
flaws” in Herbalife’s international accounting procedures and
controls, or that “persons in the parent organization also participated
in the scheme.” 175 Despite having thus far evaded immediate FCPA
legal liability, Herbalife’s actions demonstrate the incidental
consequences for parent companies in similar situations adversely
affecting Herbalife’s “reputation, financial situation, and stock
value.” 176 Despite public disclosure and subsequent remedial
action, 177 Herbalife’s share value went down shortly after the DOJ
indictment. 178
These FCPA enforcement actions exhibit the various forms of
liability that parent companies may take on for a foreign subsidiary.
These enforcement actions serve as warnings to foreign companies
hoping to do business in China, calling for compliance with both the
Regulations and the FCPA. 179 Yet also latent in these actions is the
tension between the FCPA’s bribery prohibition and participation
in guanxi gift-giving as a practical necessary for successful,
See Zagaris, supra note 166, at 408.
Id.
173 See Herbalife Indictment, supra note 166, at 14–16; see also Zagaris, supra note
166, at 407-08.
174 Zagaris, supra note 166, at 409.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 See id.
178 Id. Shortly after the indictment, Herbalife shares went down 30 cents (0.7%), from
$43.50. Id. at n.12. In addition to “substantial fines, penalties, and disgorge profits[,]”
Herbalife “will likely have to have a monitor for years into the future, for which it will
need to pay.” Id. at 409.
179 See id.
171
172
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effective business in China. 180 Lastly, these actions each allude
implicitly (and undeniably) to an arbitrary, undefined degree of
Chinese governmental involvement in China’s direct selling
industry. 181
A. Enforcement Actions & Patterns in China
While harsh on their face, actual enforcement of the 2005
Regulations in China proves isolated and unpredictable. 182 Besides
a few high-profile cases 183 imposing strict penalties or punishments
for blatant corruption, more mundane enforcement remains
arbitrary, isolated, and often haphazard. 184 The direct selling
industry should remain aware of potentially arbitrary or selective
enforcement of the Regulations in China. 185
However, recent industry developments and current events in
China may create harsher enforcement of the Regulations by
Chinese governmental authorities. 186 For instance, as recently as
September 2019, the Chinese government was conducting random
compliance checks for direct selling companies. 187 Further, as of
February 2019, the direct selling licensure system was suspended
180 See, e.g., Szto, supra note 100, 592–93, 620, 626. (discussing Chinese gift-giving
culture and the inherent risk of violating the FCPA and considering whether gift-giving of
Chinese culture can be used simultaneously to fight corruption); see also supra Section
IV-B (discussing the Chinese cultural value of guanxi).
181 See, e.g., Jeffery, supra note 63, at 39–40; Pomfret, supra note 69; Wong, supra
note 74, at 280–81.
182 See, e.g., Rubo, supra note 11.
183 See, e.g., Leader of China’s $9 Billion Ezubao Online Scam Gets Life; 26 Jailed,
REUTERS (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-fraud/leader-ofchinas-9-billion-ezubao-online-scam-gets-life-26-jailed-idUSKCN1BN0J6
[https://perma.cc/B7ZU-77CM] (providing an overview of the Ezubao case).
184 Rubo, supra note 11; McMorrow & Myers, supra note 5.
185 Rubo, supra note 11; see also Szto, supra note 100, at 592 (pointing out that
“China is considered a high-risk business environment”); Ivan Franceschini, Labour NGOs
in China: A Real Force for Political Change?, 281 CHINA Q. 474, 475–78 (2014)
(suggesting heightened power in governmental enforcement of regulations and laws, no
matter how selective or arbitrary); supra Section V. Without consistent enforcement,
illegal domestic Chinese pyramid schemes and their often pervasive corruption will not
disappear. See, e.g., Huifeng, supra note 11; Rubo, supra note 11; Jeffery, supra note 63,
at 39–40; Pomfret, supra note 69; Wong, supra note 74, at 257–58.
186 Heather Martin, 5 Events That Impacted Direct Selling in 2019, JUFULLY MEDIA
(Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.zxfull.com/en/80-resources/focus/8825-5-events-thatimpacted-direct-selling-in-2019 [https://perma.cc/8TZV-NQKB].
187 Id.
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pending a comprehensive national industry review, and Chinese
authorities were discussing, inter alia, “establish[ing] a black list
for discredited direct sellers and players, [and] increas[ing] the cost
for violation of laws and dishonest behaviors[.]” 188 In light of
potentially heightened enforcement of the Regulations in China,
direct selling companies with business in China should consider and
ensure compliance efforts accordingly, while remaining aware of
potentially arbitrary or selective enforcement in China.
VI. Transnational Direct Selling in China—Current State of
Affairs: 2018’s Record-Breaking Industry Figures and
2019 Fourth Quarter Declines for Industry Leaders
Direct selling’s declining fourth quarter figures for industry
leaders in 2019 were often linked to Chinese market performance or
presence. In 2018, the industry remained lucrative and profitable.
The global direct sales industry experienced $192.9 billion in global
retail sales for the 2018 fiscal year (ending December 31, 2018),
demonstrating an annual 1.7% compounded increase for 20152018. 189 As of 2018, China was the largest direct selling market in
the world (with the United States close behind in second), boasting
$35,731 billion USD in retail sales for 2018. 190 Likewise, direct
selling’s global “sales force” broke records in 2018 with “a total of
118.4 million people involved in direct selling globally” 191
including “over 53 million Independent Representatives[.]” 192
However, looking at major direct sellers’ 2019 fourth quarter and
2019 growth performances, 193 which “give some significant
Feng, Spokesperson, Ministry of Com. of China (MOFCOM), supra note 52.
WFDSA Announces Record-Setting 2018 Direct Selling Business Results, WORLD
FED’N OF DIRECT SELLING ASS’NS (June 3, 2019), https://wfdsa.org/wfdsa-announcesrecord-setting-2018-direct-selling-business-results/
[https://perma.cc/P3PC-7MWU]
[Hereinafter Record-Setting 2018]; FACT SHEET, supra note 3, at 1; see WORLD FED’N OF
DIRECT SELLING ASS’NS, GLOBAL DIRECT SELLING 2018 (2019), https://wfdsa.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/06/WFDSA-Fact-sheet-2018_F.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R5ZAHLUQ] [hereinafter GLOBAL DIRECT SELLING 2018].
190 WORLD FED’N OF DIRECT SELLING ASS’N’S, WFDSA 2018/2019 ANNUAL REPORT
23
(2019),
https://wfdsa.org/initiatives-and-resources/publications/
[https://perma.cc/MGL6-V9LF]; GLOBAL DIRECT SELLING 2018, supra note 189. The
United States was close behind China, with $35,350 billion U.S. dollars in retail sales for
the year of 2018. See id.
191 GLOBAL DIRECT SELLING 2018, supra note 189.
192 See Record-Setting 2018, supra note 189.
193 Hakki Ozmorali, 2019 in a Few Major Companies’ Figures, WORLD OF DIRECT
188
189
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indications” 194 as to “the sentiment or the trends in the industry,” 195
the permanence of the industry’s record-breaking numbers in 2018
proves speculative, especially within China.
For instance, despite experiencing 2.8% growth compared to its
2018 fourth quarter figures, Herbalife experienced a 15% sales
decline in China. 196 However, on the whole, Herbalife ended 2019
with a revenue figure very similar to its 2018 fiscal year. 197
Herbalife management has not offered “any guidance for 2020,” 198
yet it plans to update guidance “when they c[an] reasonably
estimate . . . the extent of impact from the Coronavirus.” 199
Alternatively, Nu Skin experienced a 10% annual revenue
decline in 2019, due in large part to its China market. 200 While the
company’s “customer base remained relatively strong” 201 in the
fourth quarter, its “sales leader count was down . . . primarily driven
by a decline in Mainland China.” 202 Nu Skin’s China sales “dropped
by 29% or by $63 million on a quarterly basis[,]” attributing 2/3 of
Nu Skin’s overall sales decline to its performance in Mainland
SELLING (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.worldofdirectselling.com/2019-in-direct-sales-infigures/ [https://perma.cc/7LHG-SW93].
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Herbalife “ended the year with a revenue figure ($4.877 b) very close to last year’s
($4.892 b).” Id.
198 Id.
199 Ozmorali, supra note 193. The implications of COVID-19 for global direct selling
exceed this Note’s scope and prove too recent for accurate prediction. For more
information on how the COVID-19 pandemic could impact not only direct selling, but
world trade as a whole. See, e.g., COVID-19 and World Trade, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/
covid19_e.htm [https://perma.cc/8U93-MJ48] (last visited Oct. 2, 2020) (providing an
overview of current global trade status and links to further sources); E-Commerce, Trade
and the COVID-19 Pandemic: Information Note, WTO 1, 1 (May 4, 2020),
https://www.wto.org/english//tratop_e/covid19_e/ecommerce_report_e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AD6T-ZNPY]; see also WTO Report Looks at Role of E-Commerce
(May
4,
2020),
During
the
COVID-19
Pandemic,
WTO
https://www.wto.org/English/news_e/news20_e/rese_04may20_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/HS76-JG24].
200 Ozmorali, supra note 193 (“Nu Skin’s [fourth] quarter global sales was $583
million, down 15% from prior year [2018] same quarter. Together with this, company
closed the year with $2.420 b sales. This again, meant a 10% annual revenue decline.”).
201 Id.
202 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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China. 203 That said, besides for marginal growth in Japan, “none of
Nu Skin’s other units posted growth in Q4[.]” 204 Nu Skin’s
management foresees 5 to 10% negative growth in 2020, but
predicts positive growth will return in the fourth quarter when it
launches “a new beauty device.” 205 “Their projected sales decline
in Mainland China for [2020] is 20 to 25%.” 206
Lastly, USANA Health Sciences (“USANA”), a global direct
selling company dependent upon China for “about half of [the]
company’s global revenue[,] . . . basically does not have strong
presence in markets outside of Asia.” 207 It experienced a 9% decline
in the 2019 fourth quarter compared to the same quarter in 2018, 208
closing 2019 with an 11% decrease in total global sales 209 and a
significant decrease in total active customers. 210
USANA
management makes no predictions for significant growth in 2020. 211
Already speculative, the viability of global direct selling, both
in China and beyond, proves even more dubious in light of the
potential impending effects of COVID-19. Thus, the industry,
particularly transnational direct selling entities conducting business
in Mainland China, must not assume that they will continue to
experience monetary success in the future.
VII. Resolving Dissonant National Policies in Transnational
Direct Selling: Effective Legal Standards and/or Best
Business Practices
Internationally-uniform legal standards in direct selling prove
lacking yet necessary, but the industry remains legally complex,
both in terminology and national customs. 212 Certain best practices
Id.
Id.
205 Id.
206 Ozmorali, supra note 193 (emphasis added).
207 Id. (“Total sales in Americas and Europe make up 20% of USANA’s total.”).
208 This 9% decline in the fourth quarter was taken from USANA’s quarterly reporting
of $271 million, “9% less than Q4 of 2018.” Id.
209 USANA “closed the year with $1.061 billion sales, a decrease of 11%.” Id.
210 USANA’s “total number of active customers at the end of the fourth quarter was
586,000, compared to 616,000 in the prior-year period[.]” Id.
211 USANA expects “net sales between $1.03 billion and 1.13 billion in 2020.” See
id.
212 See supra Section II (providing a legal overview of the global direct selling
industry).
203
204
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for transnational direct selling companies conducting business in
China may prove more effective for dodging threats of enforcement
until U.S. or Chinese national policy resolves existing tensions
between the 2005 Regulations and the FCPA.
The direct selling industry must balance the interests of
“enterprises, the consumers[,] and the regulators[.]” 213 Considering
China’s national socioeconomic conditions” 214 makes it clear that
these three entities interact completely differently than they do
within the United States. Chinese “regulators” often share interests
or control with “enterprises” and the market post-China’s delayed
economic liberalization engenders more stringent oversight of
private business in opposition to the United States’ open economy
policy and practices. 215 Similarly, as seen in the national history
underlying the 2005 Regulations and 1998 direct selling ban,
China’s “regulators” often maintain implicit control over
“consumers.” 216
After considering such Chinese national
conditions, and longstanding national tensions with the direct
selling industry, a necessary, admittedly idealistic, industry goal:
regaining Chinese national trust.
Internal anti-corruption safeguards prove immediately crucial for
direct selling companies doing business in China, regardless of
whether industry leaders incorporate broader, ideological
suggestions tailored to Chinese national culture and history as
related to direct selling. Implementation of internal anti-corruption
practices proves most vital because gift-giving must not arise to
unlawful bribery under Chinese or U.S. law, regardless of benefits
accrued by foreign enterprises doing business in China from
cultivating guanxi via gift-giving. Otherwise, enforcement is likely,
and fair, in either country. U.S.-based parent companies must
implement stringent internal anti-corruption policies, practices, and
enforcement to avoid potential liability under the FCPA for their
Chinese subsidiaries’ extraterritorial conduct. Unless and until
legislative policy shifts adapts to reconcile underlying policy
differences between the FCPA and Chinese best business practices,
transnational direct selling companies must tread carefully when
Miao, supra note 3, at 396–97.
Id.
215 See, e.g., Jeffery, supra note 63, at 39–40; Pomfret, supra note 69; Wong, supra
note 74.
216 See supra Sections III & VI.
213
214
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conducting business in China to ensure compliance with both the
2005 Regulations and the FCPA.

